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ESTATE OF PIERCE
[32 C.2d 265; 196 P.2d 1]

[L. A. No. 20156.

In Bank.
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July 30, 1948.]

Estate of EDWIN PIERCE, Deceased. BELEN PIERCE
SONTHEIMER, as Trnstee, etc., et ul., Appellants, v.
MARJORIE A. PIEHCE, as Guardian, etc., et a1.,
Respondents.
[1] Wills-Construction-Intention of Testator.-In interpreting
a will the testator's intent is to be ascertained fro111 the language used and, when an uncertainty appears on the face of
the will, from the circulUstances under which it was executed.
(Prob. Code, § 105.)
[2] Adoption-Origin of Right.-The procedure for adoption is
entirely statutory.
[8] Id.-Mect.-Adoption creates a status to which the legal incidents of the relation of parent and child attach.
[4] Id.-E1fect.-Civ. Code, § 228, requires adoptive parents to
regard adopted children as children born of such parents, but
does not require persons other than adoptive parents to regard
them as such in the drafting of private instruments, such as
wills, trusts and deeds.
[5] Wills-Designation of Takers-Adopted Children.-In determining the rights of an adopted child under a will, the controlling question is not whether he would inherit from his
adoptive parent under the statute of succession, but wheth(>t'
he is included among the persons the testator intended to share
in his estate.
[8] Id.-Designation of Takers-"Issue."-The 1931 amendment
of Probe Code, § 108, in omitting the word "is.'me" frow the
terms of testamentary disposition included therein, indicates
that the statute of succession is not to control the interprptation of the term "issue" as used in a will.
[7] Id.-Designation of Takers. - When statutes defining terms
used in designating takers in a will are not applicable, the
rules of intestate succession apply only if the testator expresses
an intention in the will to adopt them.
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[2] See 1 Cal.Jur. 41S; 1 Am.Jur. 622.
[5] See 1 Am.Jur. 665.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 272; [2] Adoption, § 2;
[3, 4] Adoption, § 30; [5] Wills, § 330; [6-10] Wills, § 325; [11]
Wills, § 273; [12] Wills, § 296; [13] Evidence, § 159; [14] Appeal
and Error, § 179; [15] Wills, § 274; [16] Wills, § 295; [17] Appeul
and Error, § 1105~
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[8] Id.-Design3otion of T3okers.-The statutes of succession and
the nnti-Iapse statute (Prob. Code, § 92), unlike Prob. Code,
§ 108, relating to designation of takers in a will, do not purport to prescribe a standard meaning for the terms "lineal
descendant" or "lawful issue" as used in wills or other private
instruments, and are therefore not controlling in the interpretation of such documents.
[9] Id.-Designation of T3okers-"L3owful Issue." - The qnestion
whether an adopted child is included within the term "lawful
issue," as used in a will, usually turns on the particular circumstances of each case.

/)

[1030, lOb] Id.-Design3otion of Takers-uLawful Issue." - An
order instructing a trustee that adopted children took as lawful issue under a provision for distribution of a trust was unsupported where the uncontradicted evidence showed the
testator's opposition to the adoption manifested by a will disinheriting the adoptive parent and the subsequent destruction
of such will on the parent's promise not to adopt the children.
[11] Id.-Construction-Intention of Test3otor.-If the terms of a
will are unambiguous and are susceptible of only one meaning,
the intent of the testator must be ascertained from the face of
the instrument itself.
[12] Id.-Oonstruction-Extrinsic Evidence. - Where an uncertainty appears on the face of the will as to what the testator
meant by the words "lawful issue," it is proper to admit evidence of the circumstances preceding the execution of instrument in order to determine his meaning.
[13] Evidence-Remoteness.-The objection that evidence otfercd
is too rl!mote goes to its probative value, rather than to its
admissibility.
[14] Appeal-Objections-Evidence - Sufficiency of Objection.When a g.·ncral objection to the admission of certain evi,l.·ncp
is overruled by the trial court, the party against whom the
ruling is made cannot raise for the first time on appeal a
spel'ific objection thereto, unless the evidence is not admissible
for any purpose.
[15] Wills-Oonstruction - Intention of Testator - Surrounding
Oircumst.ances.-The circuIllstances under which a will was
executed may relate to events occurring before its execution
and may be (:onsidered in ascertaining the testator's inb'ntion
if they have relevance concerning his intention :1t tho time thft
will was executed.

)

[9] Adoptl'd child as within class in testamentary gift, notes,
70 A.L.R. 621; 144 A.L.Bo. 670.
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[16] Id.-Construction-Extrinsic Evidence.-Oral declarations of
a testator relating to the disinheritance of an annuitant designated in the will are not instructions to a scrivener and are not
admissible under that exception to the rule excluding evidence
of such declarations to ascertain the testator's intent. (Prob.
Code, § 105.)

[17] Appeal-Presumptions-Rules on Appeal-Rule 62.-On an
appeal on an agreed statement of facts, rule 52 of the Rules
on Appeal is controlling, and the appellate court must determine from the record alone whether there is any evidence to
.upport the judgment of the trial court.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, on trustee's petition for instructions, declaring
adopted children of deceased annuitant to be beneficiaries
under a testamentary trust. John Gee Clark, Judge. Reversed.
Warner, Peracca & Magana, Wagener & Brailsford, James
O. Warner, Henry N. Cowan, "V. C. Shelton and George W.
Burch, Jr., for Appellants.
Bailey & Poe, Rufus Bailey and Carl N. Huff for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J .-By a holographic will dated March 1,
1933, EdWin Pierce left his entire estate in trust. The will
provided that a monthly annuity be paid to his widow, Edna
Dyer Pierce and that the residue of the net income be divided
in .ten equal shares, two shares to each of the four children
of a deceased brother and one share to each of the two chil. dren of a deceased niece. The provisions requiring construction are:
(1) "Should any of the annuitants, children or grandchildren of my late brother, W. A. Pierce, die before the
final distribution of my estate, his or her annuity shall be
distributed in equal shares to his or her children (lawful
issue), until finnl distribution.
(2) "At the death of the last of the annuitants, Edna
Dyer Pierce, William J. Pierce, Grace P. Holland, Chas. A.
Pierce and Harry A. Pierce, it is my will that my estate be
Jiquidated and distributed in equal shares, to and among
the surviving graullchildren of my late brother 'Villiam A.
Pierce, said grandchildren being the lawful issue, of the chil.
dren of my late brother, William A. Pierce." (Underlining
by the testator.)

)
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At the date of the testator's death on April 14, 1935,
Harry A. Pierce, one of the designated beneficiaries of the
trust, had no children. In 1943, he and his wife, Marjorie A.
Pierce, adopted lola Ann Pierce, anil in 1944, they adopted
Dolores Amelia Pierce. Harry A. Pierce died in 1945 and
Marjorie A. Pierce, acting as guardian ad litem for the two
children, made a claim in their behalf for his annuity upon
the trustee. The trustee then petitioned the trial court for
instructions to determine whether the adopted children were
entitled to receive the annuity. The trial court entered an
orlier that they were. The trustee and beneficiaries appeal.
The question for determination on this appeal is whether
the testator llsed the term "lawful issue" to exclude adopted
children. Respondent contends that the statutes governing
the status of the children and their rights to inherit control the construction of this term. Section 228 of the Civil
Code establishes the relationship of parent and child between
an adopted child and the adoptive parent, and section 257
of the Probate Code, incorporating the rule of In r(~ Newman,
75 Cal. 213, 219 [16 P. 887, 7 Am.St.Rep. 146], provides that
an adopted child succeeds to the estate of an adoptive parent
in the same manner as a natural child. It was held in In re
Newman, supra, that an adopted child is included within the
meaning of the term "issue" as then used in the statute of
succession. "If the adopted child is by virtue of its .'~tatus
to be •regarded and treated in all respects as the child of
the person adopting/ and is to 'have all the rights and bc
subject to all the duties of the legal relation of parent and
child,' the right to succeed to the estate of the deceased parent
must be included." (In re Newman, supra, 75 Cal. 213, 219.)
[1] Even though an adopted child has a status with
respect to its adoptive parent identical to that of a child born
of such parent and succeeds to the estate of an adoptive parent
in the same manner as a child born of such parent, it does
not follow that such status is determinative in construing
the terms of a will. It is fundamental in the interpretation
of wills that the testator's intent be derived from the lnnguage of the will itself and, under Probate Code, section
105, when an uncertainty appears upon the face of the will,
from the circumstances under which it was executed.
[2] The procedure for adoption, unknown at common law,
is entirely statutory. (Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 522
[126 P. 161, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 214].) [3] Adoption creates
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a status to which attach the legal incidents of the relation of
parE'nt and child. [4] Section 228 of the Civil Code defines
the rights and duties between an adoptive parent and the
adopted child and requires adoptive parents to regard adopted
children as children born of such parents. It does not, however, require persons other than adoptive parents to rer-ard
them as such in the drafting of private instruments such as
wills, trusts, and deeds. "The adoption statutes of this state
do not purport to affect the relationship of any person other
than that of the parents by blood, the adopting parents, and
the child. It is the person adopting the child who, by the
express terms of the section, after adoption 'shall sustain
towards each other the legal relation of parent and child
and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that
relation . . . '" (In re Darling, 173 Cal. 221, 225 [159 P.
606].)
Even under the statute of succession, adopted
children are not regarded as children born of the adoptive
parents with respect to inheritance from relatives of the
adoptive parents. (Estate of Pence, 117 Cal.App. 323, 333
[4 P.2d 202]; Estate of Jones, 3 Cal.App.2d395, 400 [39
. P.2d 847].) "The adoption simply fixes the stat11,S of the
child as to its former and adopted parents. To its grandparents by blood it continues to be a grandchild, and the
child of-its parents by blood. It does not acquire new grandparents in the persons of the father and mother of an adopting parent." (1ft re Darling, supra, 173 Cal. 221, 226.)
[5] In the determination of the rights of an adopted child
under a will, the controlling question is not whether the
adopted child would inherit from its adoptive parent under
the statute of succession. but whether the adopted child is
included among the persons the testator intended to share
in his estate. (Puterbaugh's E.~tate, 261 Pa. 235, 241 [104 A.
601, 5 A.L.R. 1277] ; Oomer v. Oomer, 195 Ga. 79 [23 S.E.2d
420, 424, 144 A.L.R. 664] ; see 1 Am.Jur. 665.)
[6] Section 108 of the Probate Court provides: "A testamentary disposition to 'heirs.' 'relations,' 'nearest relations,' 'representatives,' 'legal representatives, ' 'personal
rupresentatives,' 'family,' 'nearest (or next) of kin' of any
p.:rSOll, without other words of qualification. . . . vests the
property of such person, according to the provisions of Division II of this code.... " Before its amendment in 1931 this
section also included the term "issue." This amendment
clearly indicates that the statute of succession was not to

270

ESTATE OF PIERCE

[32 C.2d

control the interpretation of the term" issue" as used in a
will. [7] When statutes like section 108 are not applicable,
the rules of intestate succession apply only if the testator
expresses an intention in the will to adopt such rules. (See
Estate of Watts, 179 Cal. 20,22 [175 P. 415].)
Respondent also relies on Estate of Moore, 7 Cal.App.
2d 722, 724 [47 P.2d 533, 48 P.2d 28], Estate of Tibbetts,
48 Cal.App.2d 177,178 [119 P.2d 368], and Estate of Esposito,
57 Cal.App.2d 859, 865 [135 P.2d 167], holding that adopted
children are "lineal descendants" within the meaning of
section 92 of the Probate Code, which prevents the lapse of
a testamentary devise or bequest to kindred, if the devisee or
legatee predeceases the testator but leaves lineal descendants
surviving the testator. Although a beneficiary takes directly
under the will of the testator· under such an anti-lapse statute,
he does so because the statute substitutes him for the predeceased devisee or legatee. He takes, not by virtue of the
expressed intentions of the testator, but solely by virtue of
the statute. Section 228 of the Civil Code compels the result
in these cases as it does in the succession cases. As stated in
Estate of Moor8 (supra, at 724): "The law applicable to the
present controversy and creating the status is found in section
228 of the Civil Code providing that 'after adoption the two
shall sustain towards each other the legal relation of parent
and child, and have all the rights and be subject to all the
duties of that relation.' . . . That such adopted child is to
be considered as 'issue' and a lineal descendant of the adopting parent, has been on several occasions recognized by our
courts. • .. To exclude adopted children from its scope would
be to say that they are not entitled as to the adopting parent.
to the full rights of natural children, which is contrary to the
express provision of the statute."
[8] In construing the statutes of succession and the antilapse statute, the courts were concerned primarily with carrying out the intention of the Legislature (Civ. Code, § 228)
that adopted children be given the same rights under the
statutes of this state as those enjoyed by natural children.
(See, also, Estate of Winchester, 140 Cal. 468, 469 [74 P.
10].) These statutes and the cases thereunder, however, unlike section 108 of the Probate Code, do not purport to pre.
scribe a standard meaning for the terms "lineal ue:;ceudant"
or "lawful issue" as used in wills or other private instruments, and are therefore not controlling in the interpretation
of wills or other private instruments.
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[9] The question whether an adopted child is included
within the meaning of "lawful issue" as used in a will usually
turns on the particular circumstances of each case. Thus the
meaning of "lawful issue" has been dctermined from the
general scheme or purpose of a will considered as a whole
(Middletown Trust 00. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 69 [112 A.
689] j Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 11 [149 A. 515, 70
A.L.R. 608] ; New York Life Ins. d7 Trust 00. v. Viele, 161
N.Y. 11, 20 [55 N.E. 311, 76 Am.St.Rep. 238]; Oomer v.
Oomer, supra, 195 Ga. 79 [23 S.E.2d 420, 424, 144 A.L.R.
664] ; 'Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 681 [142 S.W.2d 680]),
or from the fact that the testator used different term~ such
as heirs, issue, and children interchangeably to identify the
same persons (Hall v. Orandall, 25 Del.Ch. 339 [20 A.2d 545,
547] ; Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 158-159 [147 N.E. 788] ;
Oook v. Underwood, 209 Iowa 641, 644 [228 N.W. 629] ; see
Everitt v. La Speyre, 195 Ga. 377 [24 S.E.2d 381, 384]).
Moreover, the meaning of the term has frequently been determined by the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the will, such as the testator's knowledge of the adoption and
his approval or disapproval thereof (Ansonia Nat. Bank v.
Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 748 [136 A. 588] ; Middletown Trust
00. v. Gaffey, supra, 96 Conn. 61, 71; Munie v. Gruenewald,
289 Ill. 468, 472 [124 N.E. 605] ; In re McEwan, 128 N.J.Eq.
140, 147-[15 A.2d 340] ; Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn.
469, 474-475 [17 A.2d 517]; see notes, 70 A.L.R. 621, 144
A.L.R. 670), or the testator's knowledge of the inability of
persons, whose "issue" are provided for in the will, to bear
children. (Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, supra, 753; Beck
v. Dickinson, 99 Ind.App. 463,466 [192 N.E. 899] ; see Bray v.
Mt."les, 23 Ind.App. 432 [54 N.E. 446,55 N.E. 510].) "Since
the language of different wills is so varied and the circumstances surrounding the testators are so different, decisions
in will construction cases are of 1(>.88 value as guides or authority than is the case in almost any other branch of the law ....
each will must be construed in the light of its own particular
phraseology and the facts and circumstances surrounding
the testator at the time of its execution." (Thompson on Wills
(3d ed.), pp. 324-325.)
[lOa] The circumstances preceding the execution of the
will in the present case indicate that the testator intended to
nse "lawful issue" in its ordinary nwaning as offspring of
parentage (3 Page on Wi.11s 152; cases collected in 117 A.L.R.
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691) to exclude adopted children. At the trial there was introduced into evidence the testimony of Edna Dyer Pierce,
the widow of the testator, who testified to an oral conversation that took place in the presence of the testator and to
other circumstances that occurred before the making of the
will. The widow testified that at a time before the execution
of the will she had a conversation with the testator in the
presence of a nephew relating to the plaM of Harry A. Pierce
to adopt lola .A.nn. who at that time was approximately 2
years of age; that during the conversation the nephew had
informed the testator of the contemplated adoption and the
testator then said: "If God spares my life until tomorrow,
:lnd I can get down to my bank, I am going to disinherit
Harry"; that Harry, being informed of the testator's state
of mind, promised him that he would not adopt lola Ann or
Dolores Amelia; that the testator destroyed a will that he
had executed for the very purpose of disinheriting Harry.
The disinheriting will, which was torn and thrown into a wastebasket, was retrieved by the widow and preserved; this document was introduced into evidence at the trial. Edna Dyer
Pierce further testified that one of the reasons that the testator did not like these minor children was the fact thnt thl~
husband of the mother of the children stated to the testator
that he was not the father of the second child, since he WaK in
jail at the time the child was conceived and could not havo
been the father. This was the only evidenee received at the
trial relating to the construction of the language of the will.
Section 105 of the Probate Code provides: "When there
is an imperfect description, or no person or property exactly
answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will or
from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of
the testator as to his intentioll8; and when an uncertainty
arises upon the face of a will, as to the application of any
of its provisions, tb~ testator's intention is to be n..~certain~d
from the words of the will, taking into view the circumstanccli
nnder which it was made, excluding such oral declarations."
[11] If the terms of the will are unambigious and are susc~ptib)e of only one meaning the intent of the testator must
be gathered from the face of the instrument itself. (Estute.
0/ Watts, supra, 179 Cal. 20, 23; Estate 0/ 80ulie, 72 Cnl.
App.2d 332, 335 [164 P.2d 565]; Estate 0/ Owens, 62 Cal.
App.2d 772, 774 [145 P.2d 376]; Vincent v. 8ecurity-F'irsf
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Nat. Bank, 67 Cal.App.2d 602, 610 [155 P.2d 63].) This will,
however, is not clear on its face. [12] The testator used" lawful issue" to qualify or restrict the meaning of children or
grandchildren. As a layman using the words "lawful issue"
in a holographic will he may have intended to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate children, adopted from natural
children, legitimate children of the blood of the testator from
adopted or illegitimate children, or he may have intended to
include children of his legatees that they rcgard as their lawful issue. In view of the uncertainty appearing on the face
of the will, it was proper for the trial court to admit evidence
of the circumstances preceding thc execution of the instrument to determine what the testator meant by "children
(lawful issue)" in the first provision quoted above, and by
"grandchildren being the lawful, issue" in the second provision quoted above.
[13] Respondent contends that the extrinsic evidence
was inadmissible on the ground that it was too remote from
the date of the execution of the will. That contention, however, relates to the probative value to be given such evidence,
not to its admissibility. It cannot be seriously contended
that such evidence wa.o; not sufficiently relevant to the testator's attitude toward the adopted children. (Trowbridge v.
Trowbridge, supra, 127 Conn. 469, 471; Munie v. Gruenewald,
lupra, ~9S Ill. 468, 472; see Beck v. Dickinson, supra, 99
Ind.,App. 463.) [14] In any event, since the respondent
interposed only a general objection to the admission of the
testimony of the widow, thn question of its admissibility on
the specific ground of remoteness cannot now be eonsidered
on appeal. It is well settled that when a genera] objection
to the admission of certain evidence is .overruled by the
trial court, the party against whom the ruling is made cannot raise for the first timc on appeal a specific objection
thoreto, unless the \!yidl!ncc is not admiFudblc for any purpose. (Orocker v. Carpenter, 98 Cal. 418, 421 [33 P. 271];
Christiansen v. Holling.• , 44 Ca1.App.2d 332, 340 [112 P.2d
723] ; Gularte v. Martins, 65 Cal.App.2d 817, 821 [151 P.2d
570] .)
[15] The circumstances under which the will was exe~uted may relate to events occurring before its execution, if
they have relevance concerning the intention of the testator
at the! time the will was executed. (See Thompson on 'Vills
8up"a, at p. 488.) Accordingl~r, in several California cases

)
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circumstances existing years before the execution of a will
have been considered in the interpretation of wills to determine the testator's intentions as they existed at the time of
the execution of the will. (Estate 01 Dominici, 151 Cal. 181,
188 [90 P. 448] ; Estate 01 Mitchell, 160 Cal. 618, 623 [117
P. 774]; Estate 01 Hotaling, 72 Cal.App.2d 848 [165 P.2d
681] ; Estate 01 Johmon, 107 Cal.App. 236, 239 [290 P.314] ;
Estate 0/ Wiersbickll, 69 CaLApp.2d 690, 693 [159 P.2d.
699].)
[16] Although section 105 of the Probate Code clearly·
permits the introduction of evidence of circumstances surrounding the execution of a will, when there is an uncertainty on the face of the will as to the application of any
of its provisions, it specifically provides that oral declarations of the testator cannot be considered to determine his
intentions. This section has been construed, however, not
to exclude oral declarations that consist of instructions to a
scrivener. (Estate of Dominici, IUpra, 151 Cal. 181; Estate of
Little, 170 Cal. 52 [148 P. 194J ; Estats 01 Donnellan, 164 Cal.
14 [127 P. 166]; Estats of Hotaling, supra, 72 Cal.App.2d
848,856.) The testator's statements relating to the disinheritance of Harry A. Pierce were not instructions to a scrivener
and therefore do not come within this exception. (See Estate
of Johmon, IUpra, 107 Cal.App. 236, 240; Estate of Maloney,
27 Cal.App.2d 332, 335 [80 P.2d 998].)
[lOb] There is sufficient evidence of circumstances before the execution of the will, exclusive of the testator's
declarations, however, to support the conclusion that the
testator intended to exclude adopted children from taking
under the will. The uncontradicted testimony shows t.hat
the testator was opposed to the adoption of these children
and that his opposition was manifested by the execution of
a will disinheriting the adoptive parent; that the testator
destroyed the disinheriting will on the promise of Harry A.
Pierce that he would not adopt these children. [17] This appeal is upon an agreed statement of facts, and therefore rule 52
of the Rules on Appeal is controlling: "If a record on appeal does not contain all of the papers, records and oral
proceedings, but is certified by the judge or the clerk, or stipulated to by the parties, in accordance with these rules, it
shall be presumed in the absence of proceedings or augmentation that it includes all matters material to a determination of the points on appeal." Thus, this court must
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determine from this record alone whether tli.'J"e was any
evidence to support the judgment of the trial .~ourt. (Sec
Alkus v. Johnson-Pacific Co., 80 Cal. App.2d 1, 8 l18l P.2d
72, 76].) Since the only evidence in the agreed statement
shows that the testator did not intend that the adopted children should take under the will, there is no evidence to support the order of the trial court.
The order is reversed.
Gibson, C. J ., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.

.)

)

CARTER, J .-1 dissent.
I am convinced that the order of the trial court holding
that the testator intended the adopted children of the annuitants to be included in the term "children, lawful issue"
should be affirmed.
The general rule is that the findings of a trial court
should be liberally construed and any inconsistency therein
so resolved as to uphold rather than defeat its judgment.
(Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Ca1.2d 95. 109 [173 P.2d 17];
Menghetti v. Dillon, 10 Cal.2d 470, 472 [75 P.2d 596];
Ensele v. Jolley, 188 Cal. 297, 303 [204 P. 1085] ; Murray v.
Tulare Irrigation Co., 120 Cal. 311, 315 [49 P. 563, 52 P.
586]; Bell v. Scudder, 78 Cal.App.2d 448, 457 [177 P.2d
796].) in this case, by giving a liberal construction to the
findings of the trial court, its order can, and should, be
affirmed on the following grounds: (1) That the trial court
realized the error it committed by first holding that there
was an ambiguity in the will in the use of the phrase "lawful issue"; (2) That the trial court, in accord with the
general rule, disregarded evidence erroneously admitted and
cured its own error by finding against such evidence; ( 3 )
That the trial court refused to believe the evidence contrary
to its findings.
The first and most basic question is whether there is present in the will here involved the condition precedent to
the admission of extrinsic evidence: Ambiguity, or as the
code puts it, "uncertainty." (Prob. Code, § 105.) Without
such uncertainty, extrinsic evidence of any kind is inadmissible for the purpose of determining the intent of the testator.
In this case, the trial court originally held that there was
an ambiguity, and therefore admitted the evidence. But on
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further consideration, the court may very well have come to
the conclusion that it had erred. If no "uncertainty" existed, the matter became one purely of law for the court to
decide. The evidence could be disregarded. Here, the
evidence was obviously disregarded. There is a logical explanation for this disregard. No prejudice can result to any
one if the court, after making an error in receiving evidence,
realizes the error and cures it by giving the document before it the interpretation it should have received from the
start.
Construing the language used in the will under California
law as required by Probate Code, section 100, it was entirely
reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the testator
had in fact not intended to exclude the adopted children of
the various annuitants by the use of the term "children,
lawful issue." This interpretation should be permitted to
stand. It is not only reasonable but also in line with the
general trend expressed in statutes and cases in this state
under which the status of an adopted child is approximated
as closely as possible to that of a natural child.
In this connection, it may be conceded that up to this time,
the California cases and statutes involved only questions of
succession and pretermission rather' than the interpretation
of documents. The trend in favor of adopted children is
nevertheless clear and so is the rule:
" [T] he rule is well settled that where the construction
given to an instrument by a trial court is reasonable and
appears to be consistent with the intent of the party making
it, courts of appellate jurisdiction will not substitute another interpretation, even though it may seem equally tenable with that accorded by the trial court." (Estate of
Northcutt, 16 CaL2d 683, 690 [107 P.2d 607], and cases
there cited.)
Under this reasoning, the trial court was bound to disregard the extrinsic evidence and had to determine the intention of the testator on the basis of the words used in the
will itself in accordance with section 105 of the Probate
Code. The alleged disregard of the evidence was therefore
entirely proper and did not constitute error.
The decision of the trial court receives further support
from the following rule:
". . . that where by the terms of the will it is not made
clear nor certain that an intestacy-whether partial or total
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-was intended, an interpretation which will avoid intestacy
will be adopted." (Estate of Northcutt, 16 Ca1.2d 683, 689
[107 P.2d 607], and many cases there cited.)
In this case, there would unquestionably be an intestacy
if respondents are excluded. There is not the slightest indication of an intent to create such an intestacy in the will.
The trial court therefore correctly concluded that the respondents were intended to take under the will.
Next, if it is conceded for the sake of argument that the
use of the term eelawful issue" in the will created an Ullcertainty within the meaning of section 105 of the Probate
Code, the oral declarations of the testator are still inadmissible under that same section. The majority opinion recognizes that rule but accords it lip service only.
'fhe evidence contained in the agreed statement of facts
shows that respondents' counsel made immediate objection
to the admission of declarations of the testator. The objection was general as well as specific and stated the rule laid
down in section 105 of the Probate Code. The following
excerpt from the agreed statement of facts shows that the
trial court misunderstood counsel for appellants:
"Mr. Shelton : We are offering this testimony as to the
facts and circumstances surrounding the man at the time
when the wjll was e;xecuted and the facts thereto so as to
make the court conversant with them.
e'The Oourt : You are not seeking by this witness to
introduce any statement of the testator with reference to
this language'
"Mr. Shelton: Yes, directly bearing on that in declarations that he had no intention . . ."
The trial court -then overruled the objection, evidently
thinking that the declarations of the testator would not be
introduced. The question asked by the trial court showed
that it was aware of the rule under which such declarations
would not be admissible. Afterwards, when the inadmissibility of the evidence came to light, the trial court must have
realized that it was subject to reversal if it rendered a decree based on inadmissible evidence. (P·;'shbaugh v. Fishba-ugh, 15 Ca1.2d 445, 457 [101 P.2d 1084].) Und~r those
circumstances, it was the duty of the trial court to dIsregard
the inadmissible portion of the evidence. On appeal, it is
presumed that the trial court disregards inadmissible evidence which has crept into the record.

)

...

)
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"In general, it will be assumed on appeal, where the case
is tried by the court without a jury, that the court considered only proper and competent evidence in making its
findinb"S and did not consider other evidence which has been
admitted erroneously and it will be presumed that such
evidence was disregarded." (5 C.J .S. 405.) The same general rule is stated in almost identical words in 3 American
Jurisprudence at page 505 and is supported by many cases.
(Bisno v. Herzberg, 75 Cal.App.2d 235, 241 [170 P.2d
973]; Oordi v. Garcia, 56 Cal.App.2d 584, 588 [132 P.2d
887] ; Farmers etc. Nat. Bank v. 8towell, 6 Cal.App.2d 373,
378 [44 P.2d 392].)
Looking at the record in the light of this presumption,
it is evident that the admissible portion of the evidence, that
is, that portion which the trial court was under a duty to
conSIder, shows nothing but the facts that the testator once
made and tore up a will and that he became angry on one
occasion. And while it may be conceded that this might
have been enough evidence to support the conclusion of the .
trial court, had it concluded that the intention of the testator was to exclude the adopted children of the annuitants,
the fact remains that it found to the contrary. Such evidence as was left certainly did· not compel the trial court
to find one way or the other. A torn will and an outburst
of rage are equivocal acts, capable of any number of interpretations. It is ax~omatic that under such circumstances
the result reached by the trial court should not be disturbed.
Finally, if it is assumed that the words used in the will
not only created an "uncertainty" but that the extrinsic
evidence contained in the agreed statement of facts was admissible (and neither of these points is conceded), the trial
court was still free to disbelieve the uncontradicted evidence of the only witness, and evidently did disbelieve it.
In a recent case, when speaking of uncontradicted evidence,
the majority of this court said: "But, of course, the trial
court was not required to believe their testimony. The trial
court is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence
and the credibility of the witnesses. It is its province to
give to the evidence that weight to which, in its judgment,
it is entitled, and to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, and if, in its judgment, the evidence is entitled to no
weight it may disregard such evidence altogether. (24 Cal.
Jur. 886, sec. 135.) II (OampbeU v. Birch, 19 Cal.2d 778,
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789 [122 P.2J 902J.) 'l'u~ dissl'ntillg juuges in this case
concurred with the majority on the point mentioned. Page
803 of 19 Ca1.2d: " . . . first that the trial court could have
disbelieved defendants' evidence Oll the subject j and second
that an inference . . . arose.
With the first I agree, but
. . . " (See, also, Trctkeway v. Tretheway, 16 Ca1.2d 133
[104 P.2d 1033].)
'l'here can be no question but that the trial court in this
case disregarded or disbelieved the evidence produced at
the trial as to the testator's intention with respect to the
adopted children. This the trial court obviously had the
right to do. (Estate of Bristol (1943), 23 Ca1.2d 221 [143
P.2d 689]; Tretkeway v. Tretkeway (1940), 16 Ca1.2d 133
[104 P.2d 1033].)
In my opinion no ambiguity exists in the meaning of the
words used. But if it is conceded that an uncertainty arose,
whether some or all of the evidence was admissible or not,
there is still a reasonable and logical explanation for the
action taken by the trial court.
In a case of this nature, reflections of this kind are removed from the realm of conjecture by the presumption that
the trial court acted in the proper discharge of its office and
did not reach an arbitrary result. The cases cited supra,
show tliat this court has often reeognized the necessity for
liberal construction in order to sustain rather than reverse
a trial court. The rule that the trial court is presumed to
disregard inadmissible evidence in the record is ill line with
this general principle. In this case, the majority opinion
usurps the function of the trial court and reverses it where,
under the settled rules above outlined, it could and should
be affirmed.

Schauer, J .. concurred.

